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Is there a case for banning short speculation 
in sovereign bond markets?
I address whether speculation in credit default swaps is likely to have driven up Eurozone sovereign 
borrowing costs. I provide empirical evidence, based on research in progress with Zhipeng Zhang, that this is 
not the case. I also describe the role of speculators in credit default swap markets. I discuss how regulations 
that severely restrict speculation in credit default swap markets could have the unintended consequences of 
reducing market liquidity, raising trading execution costs for investors who are not speculating, and lowering 
the quality of information provided by credit default swap rates regarding the credit qualities of sovereign 
issuers. Regulations that severely restrict speculation in credit default swap markets could, as a result, 
increase sovereign borrowing costs. I brieﬂ  y suggest alternative regulatory approaches.
DARRELL DUFFIE 
Graduate School of Business 
Stanford University
NB: I am grateful for the use of results from ongoing research with Zhipeng Zhang, for research assistance from Haoxiang Zhu, and for conversations with Nadège Jassaud.
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M
any have raised concerns that speculation, 
particularly with credit default swap (CDS) 
contracts, is responsible for raising the 
borrowing costs of Greece and other issuers of 
government debt. Others have suggested that 
CDS speculation is destabilising. In the United States, 
signiﬁ   cant recent attempts to ban the use of 
credit default swaps for speculating against the 
performance of borrowers include a provision in 
Waxman-Markey Climate Bill as well as the Dorgan 
amendment to the Senate ﬁ  nancial reform bill. In 
Europe, investigations into the possible damage 
caused by CDS speculation have been set up by the 
European Commission and by Michel Barnier, the 
European Union's ﬁ  nancial services commissioner. 
In May 2010, BaFin, Germany's ﬁ  nancial regulator, 
banned speculation in Germany against European 
sovereign debt, whether through the use of credit 
default swaps or outright short bond positions. 
Well known economists, including Joseph Stiglitz 
and Richard Portes, have argued against allowing 
speculation with CDSs that a borrower will default.
Here, I will explain my view that banning speculation 
against borrowers, whether through credit default swaps 
or outright short bond positions, is not an effective 
approach to ﬁ  nancial stability, and would likely result 
in thinner bond markets and poorer public information 
about a borrower's credit quality. This in turn could 
ultimately raise a borrower’s interest expense. 
First, though, I offer a quick review of terminology 
and background data. A credit default swap, or “CDS,” 
is a derivative security. The buyer of protection pays 
an annual fee to the seller of protection, referencing 
a particular borrower such as Greece, and an amount 
of the borrower's debt. For example, if the agreed 
CDS rate is 5% and the amount of referenced debt 
is USD 100 million, then the annual protection fee is 
USD 5 million. In the event that the named borrower, 
say Greece, defaults on its debt, the seller of protection 
then gives the buyer of protection the difference 
between the referenced amount of debt and the 
market value of the defaulted debt. For example, if the 
referenced USD 100 million in debt defaults and as 
a result has a market value of only USD 30 million, then 
the buyer of protection would collect USD 70 million 
from the seller of protection. Credit default swaps are 
traded in the over-the-counter market. An investor 
who buys protection without owning a commensurate 
amount of debt instruments of the referenced borrower 
is said to have a “naked CDS.”
 
If an investor who has bought protection on 
USD 100 million of Greek sovereign bonds 
decides to reduce its position to USD 30 million, it 
would enter a new offsetting credit default swap, 
to sell protection on USD 70 million of Greek 
sovereign bonds. The net position of the investor 
is then USD 30 million. Since November 2008, the 
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
has published the market aggregate of the net 
positions of CDS investors. Chart 1 shows these 
aggregate-market net CDS positions for ﬁ  ve Eurozone 
countries whose indebtedness has been of concern: 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland. Although 
these aggregate CDS positions have grown somewhat 
over the past eighteen months, the growth has not 
been especially volatile. Chart 2 shows, however, 
that the CDS rate for Greece has grown markedly 
in the past six months, in light of revelations about 
the true indebtedness of Greece, which had been 
obscured by reporting problems. The change in the 
CDS rate on Greek sovereign debt has served to alert 
investors that Greece may indeed have solvency 
concerns. Those CDS investors who ﬁ  rst speculated 
that Greece had borrowed more than it could repay 
seem to have proﬁ  ted from this forecast. The recent 
decision of Greece to request special ﬁ  nancing from 
Eurozone countries and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was prompted by its difﬁ  culty in paying 
its debt. 
Chart 1
Aggregate net outstanding CDS positions referencing 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland
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Those favoring a ban of naked CDSs have taken one 
or more of the following positions:
￿  Manipulation through demand-based price 
pressure. By this line of argument, the CDS speculator 
could hope to buy so much CDS protection that 
the CDS rate rises. As a result, the CDS protection 
buyer could supposedly proﬁ  t from the increased 
market value of the CDS position. In order to drive 
the CDS rate to high levels, the manipulator must 
pay a higher CDS rate than would apply in a “fair 
market.” As a result, the manipulator intentionally 
pays too much, losing money relative to fair value, in 
hopes of more than offsetting this loss by cashing in 
once the price is high. As the manipulator sells what 
he has purchased, however, prices respond in the 
opposite direction.  Proﬁ  table manipulation through 
price impact is difﬁ  cult. Putting aside the difﬁ  culty 
of proﬁ  ting from manipulation, achieving a sizable 
price impact would require CDS manipulators to take 
positions that are large relative to the amount of debt 
outstanding. In the case of the ﬁ  nancially weaker 
Eurozone sovereigns, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, 
Italy and Greece, the aggregate net CDS positions 
shown in Chart 1 represent small fractions of their 
respective amounts of debt outstanding. With Greece, 
for example, the aggregate of the net CDS positions 
held in the entire market has remained well under 
3% of the total amount of Greek debt outstanding.   
In every week since DTCC began reporting 
market-wide CDS positions in 2008, the increase 
in aggregate CDS protection bought against Greek 
sovereign debt was less than 0.18% of the total amount 
of Greek debt outstanding. That is, even if all CDS 
protection buyers in the market were manipulators, 
and had conspired to drive up CDS rates, they would 
have had only a marginal impact on the total amount 
of sovereign credit risk borne by bond owners and 
sellers of protection. Supply and demand for the 
sovereign's credit would cross at a new price that is 
relatively close to the “fair-market” (unmanipulated) 
price. In any case, based on research I am doing with 
Professor Zhipeng Zhang of Boston College, there is 
no signiﬁ  cant empirical relationship between the 
amounts of credit default swaps referencing Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal,  and the borrowing 
costs of these sovereigns.
￿  Manipulation through misleading price 
information. According to this view, CDS speculators 
could offer to pay so much for CDS protection 
against Greece that other investors would become 
unnecessarily alarmed at the prospects of a Greek 
default. As a result, the other investors would 
seek to reduce their exposures to Greece, causing 
the borrowing costs of Greece to increase, to the 
point that Greece would indeed enter default. The 
manipulators would, as a result, proﬁ  t. For this 
to work, many manipulators would need to conspire 
to over-pay for CDS protection. The CDS rates 
reported by ﬁ  nancial news services are based on 
Chart 2
Aggregate net CDS positions on Greece (DTCC data), 
and the 5-year CDS rate on Greek sovereign debt
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the rates offered by dealers, who would not wish to 
over-pay (unless they too were part of the supposed 
conspiracy). Such a conspiracy would be difﬁ  cult 
to hold together; any one manipulator would prefer 
not to over-pay, and allow others to do so. A variant 
manipulation scheme would have the manipulator 
ﬁ  rst short a large amount of the underlying bond, 
then over-pay for a small amount of CDS protection. 
If this particular CDS trade at a high rate is well 
noted and misleads bond investors to the point that 
the prices of bonds drop sharply, the manipulator 
could quickly exit both the bond and CDS position 
at a net proﬁ  t, before better price information 
arrives in the market. Even if this scheme were 
successful, it seems unlikely to lead the sovereign 
toward default. The prices could be distorted for 
only a brief period.
￿ No insurable interest. By taking a naked CDS, 
an investor has effectively purchased insurance 
against an event (the borrower's default) without 
having an insurable interest. By analogy, this is like 
buying a life insurance policy on someone else's 
life, leaving the policy holder with an incentive to 
bring that person's life to an end (to put it politely). 
The holder of a naked CDS, likewise, would prefer 
that the borrower defaults. This argument has merit 
if the naked CDS holder is in a position to increase 
the borrower's likelihood of default. Because, as 
we have just discussed, the CDS speculator is 
probably unable to heavily inﬂ  uence how much a 
government will spend or save, the no-insurable-
interest argument is not convincing to me.  Greece 
had already borrowed far more than it could pay 
back before CDS rates rose signiﬁ  cantly. Ironically, 
a greater moral hazard could arise if the protection 
buyer is hedging a signiﬁ  cant loan to the referenced 
borrower. The lender would no longer be as 
concerned with monitoring the borrower's credit 
quality, and could even have an incentive to force 
the borrower into default prematurely in order to 
collect on the CDS protection. Hu and Black (2008) 
call this the “empty creditor” problem. The problem 
could be mitigated by the required disclosure of 
CDS positions of those investors holding a signiﬁ  cant 
fraction of the referenced borrower's debt.
￿ Instability. The CDS market allows sovereign credit 
risk to be shifted more easily and quickly through 
the market. As a result, using CDSs, speculators can 
more easily get themselves over-leveraged and into 
difﬁ  culty. If they fail, they could cause losses for 
their counterparties, and general market instability. 
Banning CDS speculation would make it more difﬁ  cult 
for investors to take too much risk, and would make 
the market a safer place. Indeed, counterparty risk in 
the OTC derivatives market contributed to instability 
during the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. It is difﬁ  cult to connect 
this line of argument to the borrowing costs of Greece 
or other sovereigns. There have been no reports of 
failures or instability among speculators shorting Greek 
or other sovereign CDSs. In any case, the best method 
of treating the ﬁ  nancial instability caused by excessive 
risk taking in derivatives markets is to require higher 
collateral requirements, higher capital requirements 
for systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions, and 
greater use of central clearing, as discussed by Dufﬁ  e, 
Li, and Lubke (2010). These and other pending reforms 
of the over-the-counter markets will improve the safety 
and soundness of these markets. Data repositories will 
eventually give regulators the opportunity to police 
those who would manipulate these markets, or would 
take positions whose risks are too large with respect to 
the capital backing them.  Transactions price reporting 
would add additional transparency and improve 
market efﬁ  ciency.
Regulations that severely restrict speculation in credit 
default swap markets could have the unintended 
consequences of reducing market liquidity, which 
raises trading execution costs for investors who are not 
speculating, and lowering the quality of information 
provided by credit default swap rates regarding 
the credit qualities of bond issuers. Regulations 
that severely restrict speculation in credit default 
swap markets could, as a result, increase sovereign 
borrowing costs somewhat. Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) provide theoretical support for the proposition 
that short-sales restrictions impede the revevelation of 
fundamental information through market prices.  In 
the case of equity markets, there is ample evidence 
that bans on short selling damage market quality. For 
example, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) show 
that the short-sales ban imposed on a selection of 
equities during the ﬁ  nancial crisis increased bid-ask 
spreads for these stocks, increased the sensitivity 
of their prices to supply shocks, and raised their 
volatility, relative to those stocks not subjected to 
the short-selling ban. Additional empirical evidence 
that short-sales restrictions harm market liquidity 
or price discovery is provided by Boehmer and 
Wu (2008), Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007), and   
Safﬁ   and Sigurdsson (2007). I am not aware of any 
empirical evidence that short-sales restrictions have 
improved the liquidity or price discovery role of 
a ﬁ  nancial market.
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